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LIABILITY FOR PRODUCT DESIGN IN OHIO -
A FIRST STEP TOWARD SOLUTION
EDGAR A. STRAUSE* AND JAMES H. HEDDENt
I. INTRODUCTION
T HIS ARTICLE concerns an area of the law of strict liability in tort which
is now emerging from an embryonic stage in Ohio - namely, a
manufacturer's liability for conscious design choices in developing
its product. It is the thesis of this article that in the recent case
of Temple v. Wean United, Inc.,' the Ohio Supreme Court has taken a
major step toward a solution to the inherent difficulties in passing judgment
upon the reasonableness of a manufacturer's conscious design choices. In
doing so, the court has simultaneously lessened the otherwise open-ended
exposure of manufacturers to liability concerning claims of defective product
design.
The starting point for any general analysis of strict liability in tort be-
gins with section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts which provides
in part that "[o]ne who sells any product in a defective condition unreason-
ably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer
....- Under this provision, three types of cases have emerged for which there
can be strict liability in tort: where there is (1) a manufacturing flaw; (2)
an unreasonably dangerous design; and (3) a failure to warn or instruct
properly.
The majority of the early strict liability in tort cases involved products
with a manufacturing flaw. In this type of case there is an objective standard
against which the product can be compared and shown to be flawed.' The
*Senior trial partner in Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, Columbus, Ohio; panelist and
author on trial practice and products liability; Fellow, American College of Trial Lawyers;
J.D., University of Michigan; B.A., State University of Iowa.
tTrial partner Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, Columbus, Ohio; J.D., University of Chicago;
B.A., Wesleyan University.
1 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977).
2RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (2) (1965) (emphasis added). In Temple
v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d at 326, 364 N.E.2d at 276, the supreme court
adopted section 402A as the law of Ohio and further stated that it would look to the illus-
tratiye comments of section 402A for future analysis in this area of strict liability in tort.
3 See Bowman v. General Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. 234, 241 (E.D. Pa. 1977), which
states: "We begin with the distinction between a manufacturing flaw and a design defect.
The former concept relates to a product which was not manufactured in the manner that
it was designed or intended to be."
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objective standard is the manufacturer's intended design for the product. If
the product does not conform to the manufacturer's intended design, it is
deemed to be in a defective condition.'
The second category, and the one to which this article is directed,
concerns claims of unreasonably dangerous product design. In this situation,
a product has been manufactured in accordance with its intended design,
and has operated in accordance with its intended design, but the user
or person in the zone of foreseeable use is nevertheless injured by the
product in an intended use,' and in some jurisdictions, a reasonably for-
seeable misuse.' The injured user contends that the manufacturer's design
of the product was "unreasonably dangerous" and the product was thus
in a defective condition."
The third category involves products which are considered reasonably
safe in design but which are nevertheless deemed to be in a defective
condition because the manufacturer failed to issue proper instructions or
warnings about the dangers posed by the product in its intended use or a
reasonably foreseeable misuse. The design of the product is considered rea-
sonably safe and thus not defectively designed. However, because the product
design poses certain dangers to its user in its intended use, the manufacturer
has a duty to give adequate warning or instruction with respect to such
' Proof of a manufacturing flaw is not sufficient in itself to impose liability on a manu-
facturer. As set forth in Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 230, 218
N.E.2d 185, 188 (1966), the plaintiff must allege and prove:
(a) that there was a defect in the product as manufactured and sold;
(b) that such defect existed at the time the product was sold by the manufacturer;
(c) that the defect was the direct and proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries; and
(d) that the plaintiff, at the time he was injured, was in a place where his presence was
reasonably to be anticipated by the manufacturer.
These elements must also be alleged and proved in each of the other two categories of strict
liability in tort cases.
3 See Gossett v. Chrysler Corp., 359 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1966); Evans v. General Motors Corp.,
359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966); Shurnard v. General Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 311 (S.D.
Ohio 1967).
dSee Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); Anton v. Ford Motor
Co., 400 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
SThe basic difference between negligence and strict liability in tort, with respect to product
design, is that in strict liability the issue is the condition of a product, whereas in negligence
it is whether the manufacturer used reasonable care in designing the product. In Roach v.
Kononen, 269 Ore. 457, 465, 525 P.2d 125, 129 (1974) this difference was noted:
[T]he basic difference between negligence on the one hand and strict liability for a design
defect on the other, is that in strict liability we are talking about the condition (dangerous-
ness) of an article which is designed in a particular way, while in negligence we are
talking about the reasonableness of the manufacturer's actions in designing and selling the
article as he did.
Notwithstanding this distinction, there is a merger of these two doctrines in design cases
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dangers. If the manufacturer fails to provide adequate warnings or instruc-
tions about these dangers, then the product is considered to be in a defective
condition.'
II. UNREASONABLY DANGEROUS DESIGN
When is a manufacturer's design choice for a product deemed "de-
fective"? As noted, in a manufacturing flaw case, there is an objective stand-
ard against which to compare the product to determine whether it is flawed
and thus defective. That standard is the manufacturer's intended design.
In a design case, however, there is usually no element of nonconformity to
an objective design standard against which to compare the design under
consideration.' The product was manufactured, and it performed in ac-
cordance with the manufacturer's intended design. Nevertheless, because the
user was injured while using the product in an intended use, the user con-
tends that the product's design posed a danger to him and thus the product
was in a defective condition.
A product design which poses a danger to its user in an intended use
is not necessarily in a defective condition. "Many products cannot possibly
be made entirely safe for all consumption, and any food or drug necessarily
involves some risk of harm, if only from over-consumption."'" This is true
for alcoholic beverages, tobacco and numerous other products of everyday
use which pose some amount of danger to their users.
There is no absolute or objective standard of safety which will be
true for all product designs. It is for this reason that a product design is
a See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment h (1965) which provides:
Where, however, he has reason to anticipate that danger may result from a particular
use, as where a drug is sold which is safe only in limited doses, he may be required to
give adequate warning of the danger (see Comment j), and a product sold without
such warning is in a defective condition.
See also the referenced Comment j which provides that "[i]n order to prevent the product
from being unreasonably dangerous, the seller may be required to give directions or warning
as to its use."
OThere are some cases, however, involving design which fall under the manufacturing flaw
category of cases. As stated in Bowman v. General Motors Corp.,
"At one end of the spectrum are risks of harm which originate in the inadvertent failure
of the design engineer to appreciate adequately the implications of the various elements
of his design, or to employ commonly understood and universally accepted engineering
techniques to achieve the ends intended with regard to the product ...."
We treat manufacturing flaws and inadvertent design errors in the same way. We do so
not because they are both unintended, but because they are both subject to measurement
against a built-in objective standard or norm of proper manufacture of design.
427 F. Supp. at 241 (quoting Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturer's Conscious
Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531, 1548 (1973)).
10 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment i (1965).
Spring, 1978]
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not considered defective unless it is unreasonably dangerous to its user."1
This standard recognizes that even though a product's design poses some
dangers to its user in an intended use, the benefits of having a product
available to society generally outweigh the product's dangers. It is only when
the dangers outweigh the product's benefits that it is deemed unreasonably
dangerous."
In the absence of an absolute, objective standard of design appropri-
ateness, how does one assess whether the dangers posed by the product's
design outweigh the product's benefits to society - which in turn would
determine whether such product was unreasonably dangerous? There is
no simple answer. The process of product design assessment is essentially
subjective and involves a sophisticated balancing of numerous factors. The
evaluation process is a subjective balancing of the product's dangers and
its utility. As one court observed:
Where, however, a conscious design choice has caused the injury, we
are faced with quite a different problem; for there is no built in ob-
jective standard by which the jury can measure the alleged defect. This
result stems, at least in part, from the fact that a conscious design choice
necessarily involves a trade-off among safety, utility, and cost. The
trade-off may be obvious and may also be acceptable to the consumer.
At the very least, it reflects the manufacturer's judgment of what would
be acceptable if the terms of the trade-off were publicly known. How-
ever, the process of evaluating the trade-off, which represents the manu-
facturer's distillation of the forces of the marketplace, is a sophisticated
one which complicates the process of products liability adjudication."
How can the manufacturer know whether the public will agree that the
decision to accept the risks of harm associated with the design are justified
by virtue of the increased benefits or reduced costs? This question is un-
answerable until the product design is involved in litigation, and by then it
11 The RESTATEMENT, id., provides that a product is "unreasonably dangerous" when it is
"dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as
to its characteristics."
12 See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1087 (5th Cir. 1973) which
states:
Under the Restatement, liability may not be imposed merely because a product involves
some risk of harm or is not entirely safe for all uses. Products liability does not mean
that a seller is an insurer for all harm resulting from the use of his product. Rather,
a product is "defective" under the Restatement only if it is "unreasonably dangerous"
to the ultimate user or consumer. The requirement that the defect render the product
"unreasonably dangerous" reflects a realization that many products have both utility and
danger. The determination that a product is unreasonably dangerous, or not reasonably
safe, means that, on balance, the utility of the product does not outweigh the magnitude
of the danger.
is Dowman v. General Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. at 241.
[Vol. 11:4
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is often too late for both the manufacturer and the injured user. Notwith-
standing these inherent difficulties in assessing the reasonableness of a prod-
uct's design, courts and juries have been attempting to perform this function.
A. Factors to be Considered in Design Assessment Process
In a trial to determine the reasonableness of a product design, initially
the court, and ultimately the jury, must assess the product's dangers against
its utility. It is essentially a process of cost-benefit analysis.
The initial category of factors to be considered concerns the nature of
the danger posed by the product design: (a) the likelihood of injury re-
sulting from the product design in an intended use, (b) the degree or extent
of injury, (c) whether the danger posed by the particular design is open and
obvious to its user,' (d) the likelihood of avoiding injury by the user's exercise
of reasonable care, and (e) the degree to which the danger posed by the
design can be avoided or acceptably lessened by adequate instructions and/
or warnings by the manufacturer.
Once the dangers posed by the manufacturer's intended design have
been defined, the trier of fact must then assess the feasibility of eliminating
or alleviating the dangerous characteristics of the intended design. This
feasibility inquiry breaks down into a balancing of the technical feasibility of
an alternate design against the economic implications.
With respect to technical feasibility, the question is whether there was
an alternate design which was less dangerous than the one under consider-
ation." If there was a less dangerous design, one should look to whether
any of the product's utility would have been lost 6 and if so, whether the
1- The manufacturer has a duty to warn properly and/or to instruct product users concern-
ing latent or hidden dangers. See note 8 supra.
15 The time to assess technical feasibility is the point in time when the product was manufac-
tured. LaMonica v. Outboard Marine Corp., 48 Ohio App. 2d 43, 355 N.E.2d 533 (1976).
Subsequent changes in the state of the art may be admissible for the limited purpose of
showing that an alternate design was feasible at the time the product was manufactured or
sold.
In an action based upon strict liability in tort, evidence of subsequent changes and
changes in the "state of the art" are not admissible to show that the item is defective.
However, such evidence is admissible for the limited purpose of showing that an alter-
native design was feasible at the time that the item was manufactured or sold.
Id. at 44-45, 355 N.E.2d at 535. See also Bolido v. Improved Machinery, Inc., 29 Cal. App.
3d 633, 641, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890, 897 (1973) which concludes that:
Strict liability for deficient design of a product (as differentiated from defective manu-
facture or defective composition) is premised on a finding that the product was un-
reasonably dangerous for its intended use, and in turn, the unreasonableness of the
danger must necessarily be derived from the state of the art at the time of design.
16 This dilemma was recognized in Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Ore. 485, 525
P.2d 1033 (1974).
In design cases, the utility of the article may be so great, and the change of design
Spring, 1978]
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loss of utility would have been less than the greater safety which would
have been achieved with the alternate design."
Economic realities also play a role in the technical feasibility of design
choices. If the cost of the alternate safer design would have been too great,
then a product's general utility would have been lost. For example, it is
technically feasible to build a safer automobile by making it tank-like, and
this would reduce or eliminate the likelihood of injury upon collision with
another vehicle. However, it is not economically feasible to make such a
design change because the increased cost would be prohibitive.
This is the range of relevant factors to be considered by the manu-
facturer when evaluating the intended design for a product, and these are
the same factors which should be considered by a court and jury in de-
termining whether the product design is reasonably safe or unreasonably
dangerous. 8 In order to determine rationally whether a design is unreason-
ably dangerous, it would seem necessary for someone to consider each of
necessary to alleviate the danger in question may so impair such utility, that it is
reasonable to market the product as it is, even though the possibility of injury exists
and was realized at the time of the sale. Again, the cost of the change necessary to
alleviate the danger in design may be so great that the article would be priced out
of the market and no one would buy it even though it was of high utility. Such an
article is not dangerously defective despite its having inflicted injury.
Id. at 495, 525 P.2d at 1036.
17 See Garst v. General Motors Corp., 207 Kan. 2, 484 P.2d 47 (1971), where the court recog-
nized the assessment difficulties posed by this trade-off between utility and safety and stated
that:
To prove defective design, it is insufficient merely to assert that a different design would
have alleviated or averted the plaintiff's injuries, since it may be assumed that any
particular accident involving man and machine might have been avoided through a
variation in the design of the machine. However, such a variation might greatly magnify
the chances of other sorts of mishaps taking place, or else render the machine incapable
of reasonably efficient performance of its function.
Id. at 16, 484 P.2d at 61.
is No one court has outlined all of the factors which must be considered in making this
"unreasonably dangerous" design determination in the manner set forth in this article. Instead,
this listing and analysis is a distillation of those factors and methods of analysis employed
by the few courts which have addressed this complicated problem. For example, in Roach
v. Kononen, 269 Ore. 457, 525 P.2d 125 (1974), the court outlined the various factors it
deemed significant:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product - its utility to the user and to the
public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product - the likelihood that it will cause injury, and the
probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and not
be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without,
impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the 'dangers inherent in the product and their
[Vol. 11:4
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these factors, allocate some relative weight or importance to each, and then
decide what a reasonable man would do in light of this balancing of the
product's dangers against its utility. To date, however, case authority pro-
vides very little guidance on court or jury management of these problems.
In this context, it should be noted that although the analysis for strict
liability in design cases focuses upon the condition of the product, rather
than upon the manufacturer's conduct in designing the product, one is led to a
consideration and assessment of the same factors outlined above. For this
reason, even though a defective design case may be pleaded in terms of strict
liability, whether or not the design is in fact defective is essentially a question
of negligence."
B. Jury Evaluation of Product Design
As outlined above, the factors which must be considered in evaluating
whether a product design is reasonably safe are numerous and often sophis-
ticated. Nevertheless, this is the task which the law in every jurisdiction
currently assigns to the jury. This is a difficult, if not impossible, function
for a jury to properly perform.
The principal area of concern about jury performance in design cases
is that there is no objective design standard upon which the jury can rely
and against which it can compare. Instead, the jury is required to consider
each of the aforementioned factors, as addressed by the various witnesses,
and establish for itself the standard against which the design will be evalu-
ated. Having gone through this exercise, the jury will in all likelihood have
simultaneously decided whether the design is unreasonably dangerous.
In addition, the normal jury is not technically qualified to perform
avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the
product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting the
the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
Id. at 460, 525 P.2d at 128-29 (quoting Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for
Products, 44 MIss. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973)).
19 This was recognized in Halvorson v. American Hoist and Derrick Co., 307 Minn. 48, 240
N.W.2d 303 (1976).
The common element in both negligence and strict liability theories of product liability
is some kind of dangerous defect rendering the product unreasonably dangerous for
its intended use .... In this vein, one commentator has observed: "It has been argued
that a rule of strict liability which permits recovery for injuries arising out of defects
in products only when those defects give rise to unreasonable dangers is borrowed from
negligence theory. That is an apt observation, since both traditional negligence analysis
and the 'unreasonable danger' analysis make liability depend upon whether the utility of
the product or conduct in question outweighs, in light of all of the circumstances, the
risk of injury and the burden of taking precautions to prevent it."
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this standard-setting task. Most jurors in a design case will probably have
no technical background to appreciate or understand many of the areas
concerning technical feasibility. It is questionable whether a jury can be
educated during the course of a trial on the basic elements of the technology
involved to evaluate properly whether the design under consideration is
unreasonably dangerous.
Moreover, a jury trial is not an objective, dispassionate environment
within which to consider rationally these various design factors. Design
defect cases often involve plaintiffs who have been severely injured and whose
presence during the trial may create sympathy for their position. If there
were an objective standard against which to assess the manufacturer's design
choice, the sympathy factor would be of less importance. However, where
the jury itself is establishing the design standard, sympathy may well play
the major role in determining at what point the jury draws the line
between a reasonably safe and an unreasonably dangerous design.
Also, at the conclusion of the trial, after the jury has heard testimony
about the merits of the various factors, it must reach its decision without
the ability to review and/or reassess any of the testimony. The jury is re-
quired to rely upon its composite recollection of the evidence in areas which
are usually both sophisticated and complicated.
Of great concern is the role and importance of expert testimony in
design cases. In the areas of technical and economic feasibility,
a design case is basically a battle of the experts.' It is unclear if an expert,
testifying on feasibility of alternate designs, need do so from a practical
or theoretical standpoint.2
As a practical matter, courts will normally permit almost anyone to testify
as an expert who claims to be qualified by knowledge, skill, experience,
training or education.22 It takes very little foundation testimony to qualify
a person as an. expert. The judicial process assumes that if an expert is not
truly qualified, or if he is only giving theoretical opinions, or if he is other-
wise not a proper expert witness, such will become apparent during the
examination process and the jury will not be misled. However, an expert's
value to a case is often not what he says, but how he says it. Personality,
appearance, force of delivery, and many other non-substantive matters are
often determinative of how persuasive an expert is in a particular case. If
20 See, e.g., Holmgren v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 516 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1975); Stempel v.
Chrysler Corp., 495 F.2d 1247 (5th Cir. 1974); Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp., 481 F.2d
252 (5th Cir. 1973).
21 Proof of theoretical feasibility, in general, is not enough to support an allegation of de-
fective design. See Garst v. General Motors Corp., 207 Kan. 2, 484 P.2d 47 (1971).
22 See FED. R. EviD. 702.
[Vol. 11:4
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the substance of an expert's testimony is too sophisticated for the jury, these
non-substantive factors may then be determinative.
A final area of concern is the lack cf uniformity and consistency which
inevitably results when a product design is evaluated in different courts
and before different juries throughout the country. A product design char-
acteristic which may appear unreasonably dangerous to one jury may well
appear reasonably safe to another. The result is that a product and its manu-
facturer are exposed to a multiplicity of conflicting evaluations and potential
liability.28
III. THE OHIO SOLUTION
Until Temple v. Wean United, Inc., Ohio authorities appeared to be
following the trend of other jurisdictions in rendering decisions which
essentially delegate to the jury the difficult task of evaluating, without stand-
ards, when a particular product design is unreasonably dangerous. Although
most reported cases applying Ohio law involved situations where the court
had rendered a judgment as a matter of law in favor of the manufacturer
on grounds of misuse, non-intended use, or open and obvious danger, the
basic rationale of these decisions recognized that the process of evaluating
a product design is a jury function. The Temple decision, however, has
signaled a new direction in Ohio courts.
An early product design case in Ohio which is still recognized is
Gossett v. Chrysler Corp."4 Gossett was injured when the hood of the Dodge
truck he was driving became disengaged, flew up, and obscured his vision,
thereby causing an accident. Gossett contended that the hood latch was
negligently designed because the safety latch could be manually held open
when the hood was closed, and thereby made inoperable. The jury agreed and
awarded damages of $25,000. On appeal, Chrysler contended that there
was insufficient evidence of negligent design of the hood latch to permit
submission of the case to the jury. In ultimately agreeing with Chrysler,
the court first set forth the rule, which still prevails in Ohio,25 with respect
to a manufacturer's duty concerning product design:
23 For example, in a recent Pinto fuel tank trial in California, a jury made an award in excess
of $128 million against Ford Motor Company on behalf of two plaintiffs, of which $125
million was assessed as punitive damages. The jury apparently not only concluded that the
design of the fuel tank was unreasonably dangerous, but that Ford had knowledge of such
fact. Obviously, the jurors did not accept the explanation of how Ford balanced the safety
and cost factors in designing the location of the fuel tank. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.,
Nos. 197761, 199397 (Orange Cty. Sup. Ct., Cal., fled Feb. 6, 1978). The trial court has since
granted a remittitur of the punitive award to $3.5 million.
24359 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1966).
25 This standard respecting a manufacturer's design responsibilities as set forth in Gossett was
cited with favor in Temple v. Wean United Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d at 326, 364 N.E.2d at 276.
Spring, 1978]
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We do not find any cases in Ohio which specifically define the duties
of a manufacturer relative to product-design. The general rule may be
stated as follows: It is the duty of a manufacturer to use reasonable
care under the circumstances to so design its product as to make it not
accident or foolproof, but safe for the use for which it is intended. This
duty includes a duty to design the product so that it will fairly meet
any emergency of use which can reasonably be anticipated. The manu-
facturer is not an insurer that his product is, from a design viewpoint,
incapable of producing injury. 6
Applying this standard, the court held that Chrysler's hood latch design
was not negligent as a matter of law because in order for the safety portion
of the hood latch not to attach, it was necessary for someone to hold manu-
ally the safety latch and that any such conduct constituted a misuse of
the product for which Chrysler, the manufacturer, was not responsible." The
court reached this conclusion notwithstanding plaintiff's expert testimony
that the "misuse" could have been "reasonably anticipated" by Chrysler
and, therefore, the hood latch should have been designed to avoid any
such "misuse." In essence, the court held that under Ohio law, a manu-
facturer has no duty to design against a reasonably foreseeable misuse of
his product. 8
The following year Shumard v. General Motors Corp.2" was decided.
In this case, Shumard was killed in an automobile accident while driving
a 1962 Corvair which burst into flames upon collision with another vehicle.
Shumard's estate filed an action in negligence and strict liability in which
it contended that the Corvair was defectively and negligently designed be-
cause it burst into flames upon collision. In sustaining General Mot-
ors' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court noted that a
manufacturer's duty concerning its product's design was to make the
product reasonably fit for its intended use.2 The court held -that a collision
26 359 F.2d at 87.
27 The court stated:
There was no defect in the latch as produced and there was no negligence in its manu-
facture. It was manufactured strictly in accordance with the design. It functioned perfectly
for the purpose for which it was intended. It was only when it was misused that it did
not function properly.
Id. at 88 (emphasis added).
28 Although the Gossett holding may still represent the law of Ohio with respect to the absence
of any duty of a manufacturer to design against a reasonably foreseeable misuse of his prod-
uct, its precedential value has been substantially diminished by Anton v. Ford Motor Co.,
400 F. Supp. at 1274, where the court held that a manufacturer had a duty to prevent its
product from being unreasonably dangerous upon collision-a clearly unintended use or mis-
use of the product.
29270 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
30 The court stated that "[dlefendant had a duty to design its 1962 Corvair to be reasonably
[Vol-11:4
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is not an "intended use," and that a manufacturer has no duty to design
its product to make it safe upon collision. 1
In a subsequent collision case, Burkhard v. Short,"2 the court held in
favor of the defendant-manufacturer as a matter of law, but not because
the collision was a misuse or an unintended use for which the manufacturer
had no design responsibility. Burkhard, a passenger in the front seat of
a 1955 Chevrolet, was injured when the automobile was struck by another
vehicle, causing her face to strike an unpadded steel dashboard. Burkhard
contended that the unpadded steel dashboard was defectively designed be-
cause it exposed her to an unreasonable risk of harm upon collision, a
risk which was clearly foreseeable by General Motors. The trial court
sustained General Motors' motion for summary judgment, which judgment
was affirmed on appeal. In reaching its decision, the appellate court first
recognized that under some circumstances a manufacturer could be held
liable for enhanced injury, under a claim of defective product design in a
collision case, even though such design was not the proximate cause of the
collision.3 However, the court then held as a matter of law that because
the dangerous aspects of the steel dashboard were obvious to the passenger,
and because this dashboard was not unusual or unique when compared
with other automobiles, such an open and obvious risk cannot be considered
unreasonably dangerous."4
In the most recently reported collision-enhanced injury design case
fit for the purpose for which it was made and without hidden defects which would make the
car dangerous to persons using it." Id. at 314.
31 However, the court also held that "[t]he law does not require a manufacturer to make an
automobile that will be safe when involved in collisions, and thus the law does not imply
that a manufacturer warrants his product to be fit for that purpose." Id.
32 28 Ohio App. 2d 141, 275 N.E.2d 632 (1971).
33 "Under some conceivable circumstances, a manufacturer could be held liable for injury suf-
fered by a passenger as a result of defective design, even though the defective design was
not the proximate cause of, or related to, the cause of the collision." Id. at 148, 275 N.E.2d
at 637.
34 This court holds that a plainly visible, unpadded steel cowl, sometimes known as a dash or
dashboard, projecting toward the passenger's seat in a 1965 Chevrolet automobile, which
is not shown to be unusual or unique in design as a departure from the design of all
other automobile manufacturers or of all other automobiles by the same manufacturer,
cannot be considered unreasonably dangerous within the meaning of Section 402(A),
Restatement of the Law,'Torts, 2d. Under the facts of the case before us, the manu-
facturer has no duty to the passenger injured by contact with an obviously unpadded
cowl which could have been made "safer" by padding and by recessing the same.
Id. at 148-49, 275 N.E.2d at 637.
There are authorities from other jurisdictions which have rejected the obvious danger de-
fense in a defective design context. Collins v. Ridge Tool Co., 520 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 949 (1976); Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 469, 85 Cal. Rptr.
629, 467 P.2d 229 (1970); See also Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 384 N.Y.S.2d
115, 348 N.E.2d 571 (1976).
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applying Ohio law, Anton v. Ford Motor Co.,3 Anton, a passenger in a
Ford Pinto, was injured when the Pinto was struck in the rear by another
vehicle, which caused Anton to be thrown out of the Pinto's rear window
to the pavement where she sustained burn injuries from the fuel which
had escaped from the Pinto's ruptured fuel tank. In her complaint, Anton
contended that the Pinto had been defectively designed with respect to its
gas tank and/or rear bumper because another design of either of these com-
ponents would have prevented the rupture of the gas tank. In denying Ford's
motion for summary judgment, the court acknowledged that although there
were no Ohio Supreme Court decisions on point, the trend of Ohio's prod-
ucts liability cases and the better authority from other jurisdictions was to
impose upon the manufacturer the duty "not to design an unreasonably
dangerous product.""e The court also noted that this included the duty
to use reasonable care in the design of an automobile to avoid subjecting
the user to an unreasonable risk of injury in the event of collision.
Applying this standard, and noting that for purposes of the motion
the parties stipulated that the plaintiff would introduce at trial some proof
that some other design of the gas tank and/or rear bumper would have
prevented the rupture of the gas tank, the court concluded that such evidence
at trial could raise a jury question whether the vehicle was "unreasonably
dangerous in design." In reaching this decision, the court recognized that
there were many relevant factors and this determination was essentially
a question of fact for the jury to resolve. 7
Anton construed Ohio law with respect to strict liability in product
35 400 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
3G Considering both the trends in Ohio products liability law, as those are reflected in de-
cisions of the Supreme Court of Ohio, and the substance of the Evans and Larsen dichot-
omy, I must conclude that if the Supreme Court of Ohio were to decide the question
today, it would follow, substantially, the Larsen rule. Properly read, Larsen and its
second-collision progeny impose upon the automobile manufacturer only the duty not
to design an unreasonably dangerous product. In each case, the particular facts con-
cerning the type of vehicle and the type of collision involved must be applied to de-
termine whether a breach of this duty is alleged.
Id. at 1281.
7 The court stated:
But the parties to this action have stipulated for purposes of this motion for summary
judgment that plaintiff has proof "that some other design involving the gas tank and/
or rear bumper would have prevented rupture of the gas tank of the 1972 Pirto (Dodrill
car) as a result of a rearend collision causing an impacting force equivale,, to that to
which the Dodrill car was subjected .... Proof of such a nature is sufficient to raise
a question of fact concerning whether the vehicle in question was unreasonably danger-
ous in design; factors such as the particular force of impact involved and the customary
design techniques utilized by the industry in similar automobile models are relevant to




Akron Law Review, Vol. 11 [1978], Iss. 4, Art. 4
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol11/iss4/4
SYMPOSIUM: PRODUCT DESIGN
design in a manner similar to the trend in other jurisdictions, namely,
there are many factors which must be considered in determining whether
a product is unreasonably dangerous and this task is essentially a jury
function. Although no court construing Ohio law had outlined the various
factors which must be considered as a result of Anton and the other cases,
Ohio appeared ready to delegate fully this design assessment function to
the jury in the same way as it was occurring in other jurisdictions.
It was in this context of developing case authority that the Ohio
Supreme Court rendered its 1977 decision in Temple v. Wean United, Inc.
It clearly appears from the decision in Temple that Ohio has taken a new
direction in the handling of product design cases-a new direction which
may ultimately remove the "unreasonably dangerous design" inquiry from
the judicial process, or at least substantially restrict such inquiry.
In Temple, the plaintiff was injured while operating a 75-ton power
punch press. Some extrusion material fell off the press and onto the dual
operating buttons, causing the press to close down on her arms, crushing
her hands and forearms and resulting in the amputation of both arms below
the elbow. Among others, Temple sued the manufacturer under theories of
negligence, implied warranty, and strict liability. Temple contended that the
power press was defectively designed and unreasonably dangerous because
the manufacturer failed to provide a fixed barrier guard which would have
prevented Temple from inserting her hands and fingers into the danger
zone of the press.
Wean United's motion for summary judgment was sustained and affirmed
by the appellate court and by the Ohio Supreme Court. In respect to the
issue of defective product design, the court observed that although it could
find no Ohio case which specifically defined the duties of a manufacturer,
the general rule is that the manufacturer has a duty to use "reasonable
care under the circumstances to so design his product as to make it not
accident or foolproof, but safe for the use for which it is intended."3" The
court then stated that it was "aware of the difficulty and open-endedness
inherent in passing judgment upon the reasonableness of a manufacturer's
conscious design choices.""3 As a result, the court concluded that it would
look to "statutory regulation" for objective design standards which could be
utilized in evaluating whether the design under consideraion was unreason-
ably dangerous."0
.8 Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d at 326, 364 N.E.2d at 276, where the Court
quoted with favor the principle from Gossett v. Chrysler Corp., 359 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1966).
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In Temple, the "statutory regulation" was an Ohio Industrial Commis-
sion Safety Code and its guidelines with respect to acceptable methods of
guarding power presses. These guidelines provided that a two-hand tripping
device, the type of guarding device used on Temple's power press, was an
acceptable guarding device as was a fixed barrier guard device which Temple
contended was the reasonably safe design choice. As a result of this govern-
mentally determined acceptable method of guarding, the court held that
the manufacturer was not "negligent" as a matter of law in designing its
power press with a two-hand tripping device.
In view of this regulation, which specifies that either a fixed barrier
guard or a two-hand tripping device (with which this press was
equipped) are acceptable methods of guarding, this court holds that
the question of whether or not the manufacturer was negligent in not
providing fixed barrier guards should be answered, as a matter of
law in the negative. 1
The Ohio Supreme Court has thus held that where there is a state
or federal statute or regulation which recognizes a particular design standard
as acceptable, and where the design under consideration satisfies this ac-
ceptable design standard, the court will not permit a jury to second-guess the
reasonableness of a manufacturer's choice of such governmentally approved
design. The court will hold that such product is not defectively designed as
a matter of law.
Generally, governmentally established or recognized standards are ad-
missible in design cases as relevant evidence on the issue of design reasonable-
ness. However, evidence of compliance with such standard is ordinarily not
conclusive on the issue." To the writers' knowledge, Temple is the first
products liability case in Ohio, and perhaps the nation, which has held that
compliance with such standards is conclusive on the issue of product design
reasonableness and entitles the manufacturer to judgment as a matter of law.
Given all of the factors which otherwise must be considered and as-
sessed by the judicial system in deciding design appropriateness, judicial
deference to a legislative or administrative design standard appears to be
a prudent course for Ohio courts to follow. The legislative or administrative
hearing process, from which such standards would be set, is more amenable to
a full presentation of the necessary evidence on all of the aforementioned
factors from which to make a rational evaluation of whether product design
41 Id. at 327, 364 N.E.2d at 277.
42 See, e.g., Bruce v. Martin-Marrietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1976). See also R.
HURSH AND H. BAILEY, 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PRODucTs LuiLITY (SECOND) § 9.11 (1974).
See also Statement on Substantive Changes in Tort Law, Ohio State Bar Association Report
687, 693, appearing in Ohio Bar, Vol. 51, No. 23 (June 5, 1978).
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is unreasonably dangerous than is a jury trial. The setting for such a hearing
process is inherently more dispassionate and objective. Both lay and expert
witnesses on all points of view have an opportunity to be heard. The members
of the hearing committee, and certainly their staffs, are likely to be technically
qualified to hear and assess the evidence presented. All significant competing
points of view are more likely represented by the hearing committee members
and/or witnesses than in a jury trial. Industry standards, in whole or in
part, are often adopted as the national or state "code." Once a design stand-
ard is established, it would be uniform throughout the jurisdiction which
promulgated it and thus would eliminate conflicting evaluations about the
merits of a particular design which inherently result from separate judicial
evaluations.
Notwithstanding the holding in Temple, there is still a large category
of products for which there are no statutory or regulatory design standards.
Although it is possible that the Ohio Supreme Court will permit juries to
establish subjective design standards in non-regulated areas on a case-by-
case basis, there is another possibility as developed in an article by Pro-
fessor Henderson 3 to which the Ohio Supreme Court referred with favor
in its Temple decision."
In essence, one of Henderson's concepts is that where there is no
governmentally established or recognized acceptable design standard, a
manufacturer should not be subject to an "unreasonably dangerous" design
inquiry with respect to his design choice. Instead, the scope of the judicial
inquiry should be limited to a determination of whether the manufacturer
had a duty to warn and/or instruct and, if so, whether the manufacturer
properly performed this duty. Such a judicial inquiry would begin with a
determination of whether the product design posed a danger to its user
in an intended use. If so, it must be determined whether the danger
was open and obvious (no duty to warn), or whether the danger was latent
or hidden (duty to warn and/or instruct). If the danger was latent, the
judicial inquiry would then be limited to whether the manufacturer had
instructed as to proper use or issued proper warnings concerning such latent
dangers. Although these jury questions are in many respects also subjective,
they are substantially easier for a jury to handle than the sophisticated bal-
ancing of the conflicting factors in an "unreasonably dangerous" design in-
quiry. This is because each issue must be addressed separately and resolved
separately before going forward to consider the next, as opposed to the
43 Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturer's Conscious Design Choice: The Limits of
Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531 (1973).
44 Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d at 326, 364 N.E.2d at 276.
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"unreasonably dangerous" design inquiry where all of the factors must be
considered together and assessed against each other.
4 5
In addition, Temple could have a further significant impact. There are
now many statutes and governmental regulations which provide detailed di-
rections to manufacturers with respect to the warnings and/or directions
which must be made a part of products on the market. In this context, if
a manufacturer fully complied with these directives, under the rationale of
Temple, he should not be subjected to strict liability based either upon claims
of unreasonably dangerous design or failure to warn or instruct properly. 6
IV. CONCLUSION
Temple is a giant step in Ohio toward eliminating the difficulties,
as well as the open-ended potential liability of a manufacturer, inherent in
the judicial system when attempting to pass judgment upon the reasonable-
ness of a product design choice. The Ohio Supreme Court has now indicated
that if there is a way that it can avoid judicially legislating appropriate prod-
uct design standards, it will do so. Insofar as manufacturers and the paying
public are concerned, this should be viewed as a constructive development.
Temple is a breakthrough in the jungle of confounding legalisms in the in-
creasingly prolific area of product design litigation. It was decided eleven
years after Lonzrick and is a significant product tort decision of national
importance. To what extent it may be adopted in other jurisdictions, or
applied in other situations in Ohio, remains to be seen.
45 Henderson, supra note 43, at 1558-62.
4 In Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d at 325, 364 N.E.2d at 275, the Court
also recognized that the duty to warn, as part of products law, is based upon traditional
negligence concepts. See generally P. HURSH AND H. BAILEY, 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS
LIABnIrY (SECoND) § 8.21 (1974).
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